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The Cognitive Models of Change Leaders 
 




The models, schemas, recipes and mantras, which leaders of change bring to the 
projects they manage, are relatively little understood.  Here the nature of these 
structures is explored from the perspective of mental model theory.  The positive 
potential of simplified representations of business problems is contrasted with the 
negative value of certain long-cherished and counterproductive recipes for action.  It 
is suggested that many managers, when initially questioned about the nature of the 
cognitive structures they bring to their work, tend to make excessive claims for the 
stability and internal consistency of their personal repertoire of available material.  
The popular distinction between tacit models, as “undiscussable and indescribable” 
phenomena (Argyris and Schön 1996), is compared with a more dialogic view of 
managers as men and women subject to frequent changes of stance as they engage 
with significant colleagues.  Simple links between personality types or cognitive style 
and mental models in use are challenged and it is suggested that a leader’s repertoire 
of models and heuristics is often extended well beyond the zones of comfort that may 
be inferred from personality theory.  Management and cognitive competences are 
advocated as potential limiters of models in use and facilitators of change.  
Classification of the mental models of leaders is attempted in order to illustrate the 
value that individual models may have as narrational, ego-defensive, processual and 
discursive material.  The depth, superficiality and motivation behind certain models 
are discussed, as is the question of how easily leaders of change can adapt these 
different types of structure as a result of the feedback they get from the success or 
failure of their projects.  This paper forms part of an ongoing study of senior 
managers who are leading organizational change in the public and private sectors. 
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Mental Model Theory 
Early attempts to categorise the styles and strategies of change leaders (McGregor 
1960, Likert 1961, Reddin 1970, Tannenbaum and Schmidt 1973, Ouchi 1981) often 
failed to differentiate between the thinking these managers employ, the attitudes that 
underpin their actions and the types of intervention they prefer.  Similarly, 
psychometric assessment of these traits has often depended upon a mixture of such 
elements to provide profiles of each manager’s preferred style (Briggs-Myers 1987, 
Avolio and Bass 1999).  Instead, cognitively orientated management theory 
(Daniels.1999, Sparrow 1999, Maule and Hodgkinson 2002, Hodgkinson and 
Sparrow 2002) has explored the thinking processes that executives draw upon to 
formulate, implement and sustain the innovations they introduce.  Sometimes the 
research focus has been upon how change leaders make sense of their situations and 
translate thinking into action (Weick 1995, Baumard 1999), while others have aimed 
to improve the competence of such managers as change leaders and decision makers 
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(Katzenbach 1997, Senge 1999).  This paper has adopted the former more theoretical 
and diagnostic approach. 
 
Naïve or folk theories have been used by cognitive psychologists to help explain bias 
in memory, reminiscence and day-to-day problem solving, but prominent in areas 
concerned with behaviour in novel problem-solving situations has been the concept of 
mental models.  It is easy to see the resonance between mental model theory and 
leadership theory in its application to business.  First, model theory proposes that 
rationality is often bounded by constraints such as time, limited data, the restricted 
cognitive capacity of most people and their emotional states (Daniels 1999).   It 
suggests that everyone has a need to construct representations of the problems and the 
contexts that they have to face. These constructions may often develop as simplified 
and highly idiosyncratic frameworks.  A mental model may represent a possibility – 
for example, a sudden rise in resistance to change, and may assume, quite incorrectly, 
a relevance for all contexts in which that possibility may occur (Johnson-Laird, P. and 
Byrne, R. 2000).  However, it is asserted by several management writers that such 
mental representations, even though approximate, incomplete and lacking contextual 
focus, offer useful heuristics to assist in initial sense making, communicating with 
other key players and decision-making (Mintzberg 1973).   
 
According to each manager’s perception of success or failure these models may be 
preserved or adapted for new problems and contexts.  Vigilant monitoring to detect 
and correct errors is advocated optimistically by Argyris (1999) if such personal 
learning in the form of model refinement is to continue.  Reger and Palmer (1996) 
point out that failure to revise their assumptions in time to tackle new problems and 
new contexts is common among strategic planners in business. However, while 
reviewing experimental and field work on how people use such cognitive models 
Eysenck and Keane (2000) argue that preservation and adaptation processes are not 
fully understood, nor has there been an adequate examination of how mental models 
in general are created in the first place.   
 
Simplified representations of reality 
The term “mental model” has been used synonymously, in research into management 
and leadership, with a number of other epistemological artefacts (such as cognitive 
maps, schemata, theories of action, management heuristics, individual and collective 
recipes, etc.).  All are to a greater or lesser extent simplified representations of work 
and organizational realities (Walsh 1995, Hodgkinson and Sparrow 2002). 
Simplification is a dimension along which we can postulate that individual structures 
can be positioned.  At the more sophisticated extreme we might expect to find, for 
example, personal, thoughtful and elaborated theories of leadership, strategic models 
for future action and diagnostic frameworks to help criticise organizational theories 
that managers recognise to be in use in their own and other enterprises.  In the middle 
ground could be located more simple perceptions, for example, of causal connections 
between actions by a change leader and the outcomes to be expected together with 
images of desirable futures and their means of achievement.  Here we may also find 
interpretations of past successes and failures.   
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At the least complex end of the scale might be found personal articulations of 
company missions and individual goals together with some clear steps that will be 
necessary to achieve them.  In some cases these simple representations may be built 
largely around a personal or collective mantra.  The spread of such models in use 
among leaders of change along dimensions such as simplicity and depth of 
informational support remains a question.  
 
However, the view that many managers, even some who are regarded as successful, 
have become non-reflecting men and women, who depend largely upon simple 
recipes and organizational wisdoms, has found support with many academic and 
popular writers (Csikszentmihalyi and Csikszentmihalyi 1988, Senge 1999, Argyris 
1999, Hodgkinson and Sparrow 2002). Over time a combination of contextual and 
personal factors such as anxiety about their own position, information overload and 
time pressures may well cause many executives to prefer simple, safe and easily 
applicable models in order to make sense of the problems that beset them.    However, 
popular belief has it that senior managers will necessarily employ more cognitively 
complex models in their strategic planning and decision-making.  Meanwhile, junior 
executives, according to this perspective, will be acting more intuitively as they 
respond to bottom-up demands for quick decisions and solutions to problems.   
 
The latter condition would seem to require versatile heuristics or rules of thumb, 
simple diagnostic frameworks, clear associations of action and outcome and 
unambiguous personal objectives.  This point of view suggests that as they advance to 
more senior positions executives will need to construct more sophisticated and 
strategically focussed models.  However, a very different view of senior management 
emerges from the work of Clarke and Mackaness (2001).  Senior managers in their 
study employed models that were no more complex than those of their juniors, indeed 
some could be explained more simply. The mental models of the top echelon 
appeared more conceptual and less anchored in hard data. Overall it seems that 
relatively little is known about the changes to the dominant mental models of 
managers, if indeed they do change, as managers advance to top positions; how 
mature models are discarded and new ones internalised.  The perspective from 
organisational psychology suggests that many more personal and contextual factors 
than seniority alone are needed to account for shifts in the richness or simplicity of the 
cognitive structures that executives bring to their work 
 
Naturally such models do not operate in isolation.  They are to be seen as decision-
making aids which operate alongside and in conjunction with the more rational, time-
consuming and sometimes more linear processes of problem-solving (Maule and 
Hodgkinson 2002).  However, such rational-logical activities are themselves rarely 
undertaken in ideal conditions. Stewart (1967) described the fragmentation of 
decision making in senior management positions.  Decision processes become 
fragmented and time gaps separate essential steps.  Iterations between the stages occur 
as data is gathered, problems are repackaged, diagnoses suggested, ideas generated, 
action plans are created, etc..  Key players, like chief executives, manpower resource 
experts, consultants, representatives of staff, etc. may not be available at appropriate 
moments. Isenberg (1984) shows how managers can by-pass the more rigorous phases 
of decision-making when facing entangled or ambiguous problems.  Once again 
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mental models may be needed to provide sense-making shortcuts with which, for 
example, to diagnose new and unexpected developments, or to choose between 
solutions that may seem equally justified from data that is available.  They may also 
assist in constructing criteria to evaluate progress at difficult moments in the decision-
making process.      
 
Positive and negative models 
Popular management writers, business educators and consultants who have adopted 
mental models as an analytical tool have made much of both the positive and negative 
aspects of these phenomena (Argyris 1976, 1996, Senge 1990, 1999). Longstanding 
models, they have argued, can easily become dated, excessively cherished, and 
inevitably counterproductive ways of thinking about contemporary problems.  Such 
persistent models held by individuals or work groups are illustrated in management 
jargon as “yesterday’s models”  (Argyris and Schön 1996, Senge 1999, Hodgkinson 
and Sparrow, 2002).  Datedness in this literature is used mainly to describe obsolete 
mental maps about the nature and workings of enterprises, markets and business 
environments.  Other criticisms of long held models and the theories of leaders focus 
upon the irrelevance of these models to new company objectives and their 
unsuitability to internal and external contexts.  Nevertheless, several commentators 
believe that the fluctuating popularity of many of the models and ideas in use among 
senior managers can be attributed to fashions driven by a management theory industry 
(Micklethwait and Wooldridge, 1997).   
 
However, many long-standing models and recipes for change management are still on 
offer from business schools, consultants, trainers and popular writers.  In spite of an 
allegation that established mental models tend to limit thinking and acting, many 
seem to function as valuable operating frameworks for busy executives.  However, 
such mental models, and especially tacit ones, are seen by some business educators in 
a Lewinian way as potential impedimenta to the achievement of new goals.  As 
conservative and unchallenged ways of thinking they are to be uncovered and to be 
adapted or replaced by more focussed and instrumental ways of theorising (Senge 
1990, Argyris 1996, Cunliffe 2002.).  “New blood” HRM initiatives may be seen as 
an extension of this thinking in which managers and staff with dated or non-
progressive models of thinking, and who have failed to reshape their own “practical 
theories” (Cunliffe 2001, 2002), are replaced by staff whose ideas are much more in 
tune with current goals and collective organizational knowledge. 
 
A different view is taken by some model theorists who suggest that the real problem 
lies in the structural nature of the mental models we develop and how they relate to 
the complexity of the problems we face (Johnson-Laird and Byrne 2000).  As 
problems increase in complexity so does the number of models needed to solve them.  
They hypothesise that a single model application, especially where that model is 
elaborate will, when applied to complex problems, tend to result in poor outcomes.  
This has some resonance with the popular accusation levelled at business consultancy 
that it is an activity underpinned by simple recipes that are being applied to complex 
and intractable problems.   Instead, an ideal cognitive structure should equip with a 
wide range of simple, yet practical ideas, with which to tackle a variety of problems 
and contingencies. 
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The consistency of each manager’s thinking 
How well the old and the new, the progressive and the defensive, the simple and the 
complex lie alongside each other is a debated theme.  Cognitive dissonance theorists 
will argue for a natural process of dissonance reduction between conflicting models of 
change leadership.  Alternatively, processes of selective attention and perception can 
be used to explain apparent consistencies within the thinking of individual managers.  
Political theorists (Pettigrew 1990), writers about impression management (Hass 
1981, Rosenfeld et al., 1995) and more clinically orientated authors (Douglas 1997) 
emphasize a need to have followers perceive their leaders as consistent over time and 
in word and deed.  In a study of resistance to change in the retail industry Ogbunna 
and Harris (1998) have suggested that, even where new practices have been adopted, 
some managers and staff, in a search for internal consistency, will assert that new 
models are merely the old ones re-invented and that they can easily “re-cycle” their 
long held ideas to fit the new language.   
 
These findings suggest that when we examine the narratives of change champions 
there is a danger of underestimating the gaps between their own competing models 
and the distance that separates their own models from those in use by other 
stakeholders in the change programme.  It seems that the narrations of managers, like 
persons in many other occupations when asked about how they implement or react to 
change, contain excessive claims for internal consistency of thinking and action.  In 
fact the idea of an inevitable congruence between competing mental models is 
seriously challenged by Bakhtin (1981), Billig (1996, 1991).  As a cognitive 
psychologist with a background in attitude research Billig in particular, argues that for 
many people, attitudes are unfinished and incomplete cognitive structures and 
frequently contain substantial internal inconsistencies.  While Hass (1981) suggests 
that managers who are concerned with their reputation and the impressions they make 
will shift their attitudes within “their (internal) latitude of acceptance” (Sherif and 
Holland 1961), Billig sees it as natural that most people will be in dialogue with 
themselves and with close others as part of a constant process of attitude formulation.   
 
The implication here is that in many change leaders, especially those exposed to a 
wide range of narratives from colleagues, employees and customers, their cognitive 
structures are likely to consist of fragmented, and sometimes conflicting ideas about 
the best way to navigate an organization through a major change project. Some are 
likely to be ephemeral ideas, depending on the most recent “exposure” to the 
suggestions of others.  These cognitive structures are about how best to plan, involve 
staff, communicate most effectively, choose and manage interventions, evaluate 
success, etc.  Some input-outcome models about these themes will lack ideas about 
practical implementation, while others may be represented as clear-cut recipes but 
with uncertainty about appropriate contexts.  Change leaders dependent upon forming 
alliances and achieving compromise with opponents may also possess both supportive 
and critical stances on the same model for change (Allan and Burridge 1991). 
However, this does not preclude a manager from having at any one time a favourite 
set or amalgam of preferred theories and recipes for change and a preferred stance 
upon each model.   
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The inference from Billig`s ideas about cognitive repression (Billig 1999) is that 
managers may have developed a skill by which for a short time at least they may 
repress competing models.  This repression may be facilitated by a strong 
organizational paradigm of just what behaviour a good change leader should exhibit 
in particular situations. Dissonance between belief and behaviour, if it exists at all, 
may lie in the degree to which actions undertaken in previous and current change 
projects are substantially out of gear with that manager’s belief about what should 
have been done.  It seems most likely to appear at those rare and often brief moments 
of reflection, during project evaluation, training and appraisal, that are available to 
managers. 
 
Open and tacit models 
Classification of mental models and other cognitive structures about leadership has 
been influenced strongly by distinctions between espoused theory and theory in use 
(Schön 1994, Argyris and Schön 1996).  Such a distinction between open and talked 
about thinking and what are often tacit models in action has an initial validity in that it 
matches a popular view of business executives and politicians as people who promise 
one action yet deliver another.  Explicit knowledge and “claimed theory” often in the 
form of sincere aspiration, may be expected to provide support for the narratives that 
change leaders must provide in meetings, presentations and evaluations of projects in 
hand (Gardner 1995, Starbuck 1982, Shotter 1993, Cunliffe 2001).  Where hard data 
is limited, the inclusion of part of a theory, model, mental map, recipe, etc. is likely to 
be convincing (Wilkins and Thompson 1991).   
 
Persuasive narratives will be needed in everyday discourse with colleagues and 
followers, coping with surprises, failure, etc. and in constructing a personal reputation 
as a leader.  Tacit cognitive structures too may be seen to support the busy 
professional or business executive (Polanyi 1967).  Intuitive decision-making has 
been shown to rely upon recipes, models and part theories, which many managers 
rarely, if ever, articulate.  According to Walsh (1995) much management decision-
making should be regarded as bottom-up processing in which many executives must 
respond quickly to urgent problems without the time for reflection or the scanning of 
their espoused theory.  Researching the diagnostic skills of doctors, Patel (1999) 
described their tacit knowledge and the models they contain as largely procedural 
frameworks, which were rarely articulated. In fact such tacit material may not yet 
have been abstracted from a number of well-learned medical routines (Eraut 2000).  
Patel argued that this tacit material is essentially different material from more 
elaborate espoused or publicly “talked about” models because of its simplicity and its 
dependence upon earlier learned structures.  This tacit material could only be inferred 
from a doctor’s behaviour and would be most in use with routine medical problems.  
Sternberg and King proffer much the same notions about tacit knowledge in studies of 
medical practitioners, salesmen, managers and teachers. 
 
According to Argyris (1999) managers may operate defensive routines to reduce risk 
to their reputations or to protect themselves when in difficult or stressful contexts.  
Tacit, subtle and private theories of action and personal goals and organizational 
objectives can be observed at work although they do not readily surface in their 
everyday discourse with colleagues. Indeed this corpus of knowledge is sustained by 
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avoiding systematic enquiry such as appraisal, 360” feedback, psychometric testing, 
reflection, etc.   Billig (1999) argues that in many settings people learn to repress 
recipes or frameworks which have been recently in use and which may be pertinent to 
work in hand.  Presumably such repression occurs in the business environment as a 
result of disapproval by senior management, pressure by subordinates, etc.  Recent 
enquiry into corporate fraud and misconduct by executives has revealed a similar 
denial process (Punch, 1996).  Tacit models may also be associated with the 
construction of a personal identity or the achievement of career ambitions but even 
here they remain unstated and so are free from attack.  According to Argyris and 
Schön (1996) such knowledge is usually “indescribable and undiscussable”. Tacit 
models are indescribable because many managers are unaware of the thinking that 
underpins certain actions and undiscussable in that there is a local consensus to 
remain silent about how certain problems are tackled.   
 
According to a body of writers in the field of management training, the development 
of innovators in business will not succeed until their tacit models are made explicit 
and thus, amenable to change.  The ideal learner appears to be Argyris` Model II 
management thinker noted for his or her competence in reflection and evaluation.   
However, the notion of a tacit core of conservative, unchanging mental models 
matched by an outer layer of narrated and eminently adaptable recipes for success as a 
business person is seriously challenged by neuroscientists like Damasio (2000).  He 
distinguishes between a “core self” which is less accessible but constantly subject to 
new experiences, and a more artificially preserved self he describes as an 
autobiographical phenomenon.  Drawing upon Dennett (1993) and Damasio (2000), 
and from the perspective of autobiography and the novel, Lodge (2002) offers a 
similar view of men and women seeking self control and self-definition through 
controlling and elaborating the stories they pass on to others.       
 
A non-approachable corpus of models 
Just how unknown are these tacit models to an experienced manager who is in 
dialogue with colleagues who, according to emotional intelligence theorists, is 
empathetic and possesses a high order of social skill (Goleman, 1998)?   Polanyi 
(1967) points out that, whatever the circumstances, it is normal for people to know 
much more than they can say.  Much of this implicit knowledge amongst managers 
and professional workers (Schön 1996, Eraut 2000) has been absorbed either from 
experience or instruction without any awareness of the adoption of the new sets of 
ideas.  Eraut goes further to suggest that many routines or recipes in use may not have 
been conceptualised as mental models or recipes for action.  Accordingly, 
experienced managers are said to often find difficulty in recalling events or 
experiences, which were instrumental in the formation of both the tacit, and the 
explicit models they employ.  
 
 In fact the case for tacit mental models or private agendas, which are largely 
unknown to the manager concerned, is argued strongly from several viewpoints.  
Cognitive psychologists like Shotter (1993) and Cunliffe (2001) see a need to get into 
the inner consciousness of people if we are to enable them to reconstruct and adapt 
these structures.  Cunliffe, in particular, regards most forms of reflection as little more 
than providing patterns of simplistic rationalization.   A deeper analysis is called for 
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in the form of reflexivity, by exposing contradictions, doubts and complications in 
each manager’s thinking.  It seems that little personal development in anything other 
than technical and procedural competences is feasible until such individuals are aware 
of the tacit ideas, which have been blocking out alternatives and opportunities for 
discussion.  From this perspective modern management consultants can be seen as 
diagnostic clinicians working with clients in need of psychotherapy within support 
groups.  Occupational psychology too may have contributed to this essentially clinical 
stance on the need to explore the unawareness of managers through the popular use of 
facilitating devices like Mouton and Blake’s Managerial Grid, 16PF, OPQ, FIRO-B, 
Myers-Briggs, etc.   
 
This tradition of an unconscious or non-approachable corpus of ideas, feelings and 
models has a long tradition of renowned proponents (Freud, 1973).  Besides the well-
known methodological problems attributed to these early workers, a major conceptual 
reason for challenging the position is that, in all but pathological cases, mental life, if 
that means mental models, ideas, heuristics, etc. must essentially have some degree of 
consciousness. In emphasising this view, Grayling (2002) prefers to distinguish 
between ideas at the centre of attention, that is “occurrent states” and “dispositional 
states” which are not but could become so.    Such a classification matches well with 
Billig`s suggestion that a manager is able to push aside firmly espoused theory or 
models in use and quickly forget that he or she has done so.  For Billig the repression 
is of short duration until, we may presume, opportunities for implementation of the 
original ideas have returned.   
 
Cunliffe (2002) attributes this repression process to dialogue with colleagues, staff, 
customers and stakeholders when she describes managers as “rhetorical beings” often 
arguing with themselves and others as they are shifted in their thinking about 
leadership by significant people in their organizations and by unfolding events.  
Presumably such “shifting “ or change of stance may be expected across claimed 
theory and more tacit structures.  Whether these shifts are relatively minor changes of 
stance within narrow latitudes of acceptance or whether dialogue with colleagues 
regularly bring about major changes of thinking is not clear.   
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Collective and Organizational Models 
Just as individual cognitive structures exist at various levels of open-ness and tacit-
ness so do collective models about management and leadership (Baumard 1999).  
Explicit collective models may be seen, for example, where managers display 
“approved” styles of management while other non-company models of leadership are 
eschewed.  More prosaic examples of explicit collective knowledge can be found in 
company visions, internal exhortations, organizational agendas, and norms and 
standards of customer care (Spender 1998).  Within some organizations there may 
exist a tacit core of models for action in the enterprise (Starbuck 1983). This may 
include powerful models relating to, for example, managerial control, communication 
and decision-making.  Such requirements for compliance are often not talked about, 
although newcomers will be expected to conform immediately.  Tradition or 
established modes of working can act as potent yet undiscussed influences upon even 
senior executives.   
 
Such influences we can expect, according to Nicholson and West (1988) in their study 
of role transitions, will be mediated by the social motivation of each new manager.  
Most likely to adopt the collective ideas of their immediate department or work group 
will be those executives who have a strong need for social approval from the close 
members of their team. Schein (1985) suggests that certain internal transitions will 
tend to accentuate the informal socialisation of a newly appointed executive.  In his 
view internally promoted personnel who have received little formal development, will 
be particularly liable to absorb locally practised models for action.  Personal 
confidence, a sense of internal locus of control (Rotter (1966) and prior experience of 
other modes of working may provide a greater level of resistance to collective models 
in use.  However, by no means all knowledge about collective wisdoms is absorbed 
through day to day socialisation (Nonaka 1991) since more confident executives may 
feel able to appropriate those models and recipes they feel combine well with their 
existing explicit thinking and any reflections of tacit thinking that they can generate.  
Top management initiatives such as the creation of a company mission, the 
appointment of external consultants, the creation of widely read critical reports, the 
use of executive appraisal and energetic use of management development 
programmes are features of the business environment with which a senior manager 
responsible for leading change must engage.  How many collective models can be 
adopted in full or in part?  What existing ideas can be retained and reworked?    
 
Cognitive inertia 
In some organizations dominant coalitions will have provided clear sets of models, 
theory, mental maps, recipes and means-goals for a recently appointed change leader.  
Over time such explicit guidance for action may become dysfunctional if the models 
involved have come to lag behind political and environmental conditions.  The term 
“cognitive inertia” has been used to illustrate such a lack of adaptation to once 
successful collective models and continuing commitment to failing courses of action.  
Turnover in top management positions (Virany, Tushman and Romanelli, 1992) and 
the creation of heterogeneity in top teams (Milliken and Lant 1994) have been seen as 
effective ways of updating collective management models and breaking up the 
stagnation of company thinking.  However, just how quickly and deeply these new 
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formats are absorbed by senior managers and how much of the old messages from 
former dominant coalitions is retained as tacit collective theory, is less well known. 
 
Upper echelon theory (Hambrick and Mason 1984) suggests that in many large and 
medium sized enterprises such dominant coalitions create a cognitive base from 
which individual executives may draw to augment, rework or elaborate their own 
thinking. Ideas may have been imported directly from competitors or delivered by 
new appointees and consultant organizations.  Such a cognitive base will, of course, 
vary in focus and content from company to company.  However, it may well contain 
collective mental maps about the nature of the industry or activity within which the 
enterprise exists. Impressions about relationships with customers, suppliers, 
competitors and other key agencies are often contained in these maps.  Besides these 
representations of the local business world, it seems likely that the cognitive base will 
include models of corporate ambition, means-outcome associations, strategic plans 
and a wealth of recipes for good management.  Here we should also expect to find 
strong prescriptions for product or service quality, means-end models for quality and 
ideas about organizational structures.  However, clear-cut and easily recognisable 
norms for effective change leadership may be less evident elements within this 
cognitive base.   
 
Studies of large organizations in particular have suggested that a plethora of 
contrasting models about leading change may exist at any one time.  Considerable 
disagreement may exist in upper echelons about stylistic features of leadership such 
as, for example, tough and tender-mindedness, the significance of transformational 
and transactional management and the respective merits of theory X and Y.  In fact 
collective theory about what makes effective leadership and change management may 
be confused, incomplete and unintelligible.  However, where attempts have been 
made to standardise the thinking of senior teams through external consultancy or the 
pre-eminence of a key or “star” executive we might expect to find a much clearer, if 
sometimes limiting, set of collective wisdoms about the nature of effective leadership. 
 
“Placebo thinking” 
While some collective wisdoms about how to act as a senior manager may be seen to 
influence managers` behaviour, certain explicit and tacit collective models have been 
described as merely placebo thinking (Baumard 1999).  Placebo material has been 
illustrated variously as “just talk”, “will suffice”, “it’ll do” narratives.    Presumably 
these structures are mental models in use or those heard often informally which reveal 
in the speaker a commitment to action which offends no-one and which is 
independent of context and the specific needs of the enterprise and its staff.  Placebo 
models offer little real help as heuristics or diagnostic frameworks and are often low 
on ideas for implementation yet enjoy organization-wide acceptance.  They can take 
the form of simple slogans or mantras such as “in this company we take care of our 
employees” or “we favour management by walking about”, “leaders need to 
understand the minds of their staff”, etc.    All are received wisdoms that form part of 
the management discourse of popular business magazines, publications by business 
gurus and the conversations of businessmen and women.   None contains a tested 
means-end connection and contextual focus is missing.  All seem relatively benign 
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and comforting and comply with broad social values of warmth, goodwill and conflict 
avoidance.  
 
Even less sophisticated are the cognitive structures that emerge from the material of 
office and management gossip about the enterprise, its leadership and its future, of 
rumours about impending threat, organizational story telling and departmental 
humour.  Baumard (1999) talks of individual managers seeking a local rather than 
organizational coherence as they build a boundary around themselves.  The term 
“cognitive fuzz” has been used to describe material that individuals use to construct 
unofficial boundaries or simple models for organizational differentiation with phrases 
like “we are engineering people”.  Such simple typological and predictive models act 
as protective devices, often invented by sub-groups of managers to strengthen group 
identity and create local zones of personal liberty. Humour, organizational stories and 
rumour have been seen by several authors (Brown 1995) as similar devices with 
which managers and staff may sustain themselves in the face of forthcoming changes.   
 
These may contain half-digested or simplistic models that can be put to use to fend off 
new recipes on offer from a top echelon team.  They may have considerable value as 
conversational blockers such as - “of course, you know, it certainly won’t work here”.  
Through the simple models these stories contain, company members receive 
reminders about how they should think and behave.  Some will confirm formal and 
informal rules and the consequences of compliance or deviation (Brown 1995).  
Subtle behavioural messages may also be seen at a linguistic and symbolic level in job 
and organizational titles, as with “associates” (BHS, IKEA, Wal-mart), “crew” 
(McDonalds) “cast” (Disney) and police “service” rather than “force” (London 
Metropolitan Police).     
 
Employing favourite and less preferred models 
For the complex problem solving to be found in many senior management posts we 
might expect that several relevant mental models or schema need to be held in 
readiness (Eysenck and Keane 2000). Given such a state of conscious and tacit 
readiness, the label of repression may seem an overstatement of what could be no 
more than a prioritising process in which business leaders use one set of models to 
analyse a problem, another for constructing a suitable narration for a specific audience 
while holding in reserve others as means of handling and deflecting challenges (Allan 
and Burridge, 1991, Gardner, 1995).  Thus while certain preferred knowledge or 
means-end associations come into use to deal with a leadership problem at any one 
moment, other, secondary models may be in use to help block or argue against 
counter-proposals from colleagues, staff, etc.  Indeed, a single argument or simple 
model which is used on one occasion to promote the use of teams to develop new 
organizational goals, may on another, by highlighting the impossibility of carrying out 
much needed prior team training, be used in the rhetoric of individualism.  This 
picture of change leaders with a library of mental models, each of which may be 
prioritised or demoted according to a leader’s perception of his or her power base, 
personal competence and the receptivity of followers has a strong face validity.   
 
However, from the perspective of identity theory we might expect that many change 
leaders will have developed a favourite cluster of openly espoused models and less 
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conscious frameworks in frequent use.  This, presumably, is how they like to be 
known, described and evaluated by colleagues.  Such central models may be drawn 
from periods of work experience and from occupational training.  Certain 
occupational groups have been shown to be associated with different learning and 
thinking styles, data dependencies and associated mental models.  For example, 
comparisons of managers in engineering with those in marketing, personnel or 
finance, for example, may be expected to reveal different styles and cognitive 
structures. Over time the models in use may be subject to adaptation.   
 
Cimino (1999) has shown that as doctors become more sophisticated they become 
able to switch models in use even where the switching may require relegating well 
used frameworks in favour of ideas less central to their disciplinary preferences.  
More experienced doctors seem more able to move back and forth between simple 
heuristics or “rule of thumb” checks and more rational/logical decision models for 
diagnosis and prescriptive action.   Might we expect to find a similar maturation in the 
use of mental models and in this dualistic process of problem solving in senior 
managers who are involved in the introduction of changes to their organization?   Or 
in the absence of continuous learning might we find in some managers nearing 
retirement, the development of the cognitive type that Fiske and Taylor (1991) have 
labelled “cognitive miser”?  In leadership terms this describes a person who is 
dependent largely upon one favourite set of models and who has little interest in 
extending his or her library of ideas for problem diagnosis, narration or implementing 
action.  
 
Less preferred mental frameworks, too, may have a functional value to an individual 
executive.  They may provide material that can assist in, for example, empathising 
with colleagues, understanding the tactics of competitors and preparing a narration, 
which will be perceived as having a balanced point of view.  From an evolutionary 
and survival perspective the ability to run through the assumed perspectives of others 
may have considerable tactical value, especially where those models are very 
different. Poorly formed, ill-conceived and only partially understood recipes for 
action may also have some value as blockers, providing some convenient, if 
unsustainable, devices with which to reject rival proposals.  Placebo or common sense 
models (Baumard 1999) that will suffice for virtually any situation may be needed 
especially on symbolic occasions when all that is needed is a reiteration of a popular 
piece of management discourse.   
 
Personality and models in use  
Specific personality traits have been linked with a manager’s willingness to take on 
board feedback that is critical of models in use.  Narcissism in particular has been 
regarded as a commonly found trait among senior managers, which can act as a 
double-edged sword. According to Gladwell (2002) narcissistic leaders, while 
showing success in moving up the echelons of management, tend to make excessive 
claims of success and eschew discussion of any shortcomings to their ideas.  It seems 
that the narcissistic manager will be ready to present his or her models for action 
whenever a gap occurs within the thinking of the top management team but will create 
some form of insulation, through unavailability or organizational remoteness, to avoid 
any form of deep reflection about project failures.   
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Narcissism in the leadership of change appears to be associated with the confident 
espousal of recipes for action, diagnostic frameworks, etc. which are quickly believed 
and assume disproportionate importance with colleagues.  Anxiety and depression are 
two further mental states that have been linked with distinctive responses to business 
problems.  Anxiety has been associated with the tendency to spend excessive time and 
attention on the most threatening features of a business problem.  Even mildly 
depressed individuals may tend towards a general pessimism about prospects of 
achieving a solution.  In mental model theory, anxious leaders while narrating with 
confidence their espoused theories have a distinctively negative approach to sense 
making and problem diagnosis while depressed managers carry at both explicit and 
tacit levels a number of negative associations between action and outcome.  
 
In general, personality theory, while accepting that many cognitive frameworks about 
leadership can be finely tuned though training and education, regards such alterations 
as surface adaptation.  Organizational mantras, recipes and checklists, can be brought 
up to date through short courses, management “away days”, consultant coaching, etc. 
but several personality psychologists would have us expect that, at a deeper level, 
models that make emotional or social demands will remain less moveable.  
Leadership or change models that carry a high risk of failure, potential loss of 
reputation, threat of personal stress or career disadvantage are likely to be avoided by 
certain personality types.  Furthermore, it is suggested that “hard” and “soft” 
approaches to leadership are related to certain personality types. A hard approach may 
differ from a soft approach in, for example, degree of control, participation and risk 
avoidance.  However, so-called soft interventions such as organizational development 
(OD) may be seen to have their hard exponents.  Similar anomalies may be found in 
practices involving process engineering and other tough formulae for leading 
organizational change.  So the viewpoint from this branch of individual psychology is 
that personal preferences such as, for example, tough-mindedness rather than softer 
approaches, clarity and structure rather than open-ness and ambiguity, and 
defensiveness rather than open-ness, are stable structures that may limit the ability of 
change leaders to internalise new strategies.  It seems from this perspective that while 
experience may well enable an executive to increase his or her repertoire of 
interventions, filters at a deeper level will control what new prescriptions are to be 
applied and the manner of their implementation. 
 
Such simple conceptions of a link between clear-cut personality traits and espoused 
models are seriously questioned by occupational psychologists such as Apter (1989), 
who argue that such traits are often balanced by contrasting characteristics, for 
example that assertiveness may be balanced by tender-minded qualities.  Apter`s 
position has, of course, led him to doubt the predictive qualities of personality testing 
in general, but it also suggests the cognitive structures associated with specific 
personality traits may, like Billig`s discursive conception of attitude, contain a variety 
of mental models.  This position suggests that personality theory merely provides a 
restrictive and simplistic picture of the cognitive life of managers.  Indeed, if as many 
writers suggest, change leaders are frequently pressed into demonstrating dramatic 
changes in their managerial behaviour (Johne and Davies 1999) then it seems likely 
that these executives will carry a repertoire of models for action which will extend 
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well beyond those that seem to fit their natural disposition.  Indeed, concerns with 
the control of feedback, maintenance of reputation etc. are unlikely to be limited to 
narcissistic personalities and those with anxiety or neurotic traits.  The insecurities of 
managerial work make it likely that most leaders of change, not merely those lacking 
certain desirable personality traits, will from time to time experience serious doubts 
about their ability to employ the interventions they choose or have imposed upon 
them.  They may regard certain change models as particularly risky, containing 
problematic elements and difficult to control.   
 
Managerial competences as mediators of available mental models 
The competence movement has attempted an atomistic examination of the role of 
managers and business leaders.  This has included a behavioural approach (Boyatzis 
1982), an essentially cognitive perspective (Schroder 1989, Hodgkinson and Sparrow 
2002), and a more job centred analysis by the Management Charter Initiative (MCI).  
More idiosyncratic research by individual enterprises has striven to identify the key 
competences necessary for successful management within specific company 
environments.   
 
The MCI offers the least sophisticated of these approaches culminating in a collection 
of generalised statements about the basic elements of management at different 
organizational levels.  While these findings fail to recognise the local understanding 
that most managers need, they have provided simple frameworks with which many 
executives have come to evaluate themselves and have others appraise them.  
Whatever the shortcomings of this classificatory process, this approach has enabled 
many managers to gain insight into their relative successes and failures within a series 
of given roles.  This process has been facilitated by an increasing use of reflective 
processes such as coaching, counselling, questionnaire feedback, etc.  However, some 
questions remain about the cognitive significance of self-perceived competences.  We 
do not know the extent to which managers with an enhanced sense of their 
interpersonal, operational and informational competences use this awareness to adopt, 
reject and internalise mental models that have been on offer within their training and 
development through experience.  Can we show that executives tend to employ 
change models which best fit their own competence profiles and avoid those that pose 
a serious threat?  For example, can we expect that while most people agree that 
extensive communication should precede changes at work, those change leaders who 
fear that they and their close colleagues lack the competences needed to control the 
repercussions, will avoid such action?  Similarly, where collective models of open-
ness in employee relations form part of everyday management discourse, yet 
backstage and clandestine models are in use, to what extent can we attribute this 
discrepancy to low levels of confidence in their own competence amongst the 
managers involved?   
 
Cognitive Competences 
While research into the cognitive competences of managers has been a relatively new 
development, the idea of managers having “cognitive limits” to their thinking has a 
long history.  Early ideas about IQ and verbal and non-verbal intelligence, and 
complex problem solving as selection and promotion criteria for management posts 
have long been incorporated into the repertoire of assessment centres.  Underpinning 
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this application of psychometrics has been a vision of so-called intelligence as a 
critical enabling trait, rather than one associated with particular kinds of thinking 
about being a manager.  Less enduring have been vaguer concepts like the Peter 
Principle (Peter and Hull 1970) that suggested that every manager has a built-in limit 
for organizational progress with a state of general incompetence appearing when that 
limit has been passed.   
 
Several studies have highlighted the importance of concept formation, that is the 
ability to learn from recurrent patterns of activity within a company, to construct 
accurate mental models and to form cause and effect associations between managerial 
action and later outcomes (Cockerill 1989, Schroder, 1989).  Such a competence can 
be seen as an important sense-making aid to managers at any level faced with 
recurrent problems.  Even more significant, we may conclude, have been a group of 
ideas about the flexibility of thinking that some managers appear to demonstrate.  
Conceptual flexibility has been proposed, that is the ability to hold different, even 
competing models or action plans in mind simultaneously, while evaluating the 
potential of each one. Cognitive flexibility, it is said, enables many managers to move 
back and forth quickly between intuitive and much more explicit rational, databased 
forms of logical thinking.   
 
The intuitive extreme of this competence has been described by Csikszentmihalyi and 
Csikszentmihalyi (1988) as “competent mindlessness” or knowing when to “go with 
the flow”.  This refers to conditions when managers operate without apparent 
conscious recourse to rule based or rational models of problem solving.  Such a 
controlled “mindlessness” has been linked variously with business environments 
typified by time management pressures, work and information overload, excessive 
uncertainty, requirement for rapid or unexpected decisions and the absence of explicit 
clues (Burke and Miller 1999, Hodgkinson and Sparrow 2002).  It is suggested that 
these competences illuminate the processes by which managers construct, adapt, 
prioritise and discard the mental models they acquire.  Serial shifting has been 
proposed (Gurwitsch 1966) as a process by which managers move quickly from idea 
to idea, singling out for attention a particular aspect of the recipe in focus or quickly 
creating a powerful model from what had been hitherto a vague idea.    A combination 
of generative processes, by which existing models for action are retrieved, and an 
exploratory process, which innovates and evaluates existing mental structures, is 
proposed by Finke and Bettle (1996) as a key ingredient of creative intuitive thinking.  
Such abilities that enable individuals to constantly evaluate, rebuild and replace 
mental models through the help of metaphors, mental models, internal and external 
dialogue, etc. is likely to be a valuable asset where new understandings of business 
problems are needed.   
 
A Classification of Mental Models and their Susceptibility to Modification 
While we can infer from mental model theory that a repertoire of simple 
representations or models is likely to be an important decision-making aid to most 
change leaders, the relevance of such models has been extended by writers who have 
explored the nature of consciousness from a more social and interpersonal perspective 
(Dennett 1993, Damasio 2000); According to these authors, tactical plans are 
formulated in the form of problem solving models designed for self-definition, self-
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control and the development of social and personal identities.  To accommodate the 
range of purposes that these mental structures may fulfil, six hypothetical categories 
are proposed here to describe the ideas that senior managers may employ.  First, and 
perhaps the largest category, contains what may be called the multi-purpose models 
which include the mantras, recipes, mental models and maps which form the core of 
change leaders` thinking; they may serve any purpose; together, they underpin the 
personal strategies of these individuals.   
 
The remaining categories contain cognitive structures that serve more specific 
purposes.  Second are the narrational models that provide the building blocks with 
which leaders construct the presentations they give to staff, colleagues, their bosses 
and the other important people around them.  At a personal level they offer recipes for 
personal change and identity building.  Certain narrational models, as we have seen, 
can function as defensive counters against the ideas of opponents, and competitors.  
However, a third category of ego-defensive formulae and recipes may be seen to offer 
psychological defence against risking personal failure and the avoidance of certain 
behaviours within a leadership role.  A fourth category of analytical frameworks is 
proposed.  These models can be used to understand business problems as they occur, 
make sense of feedback and evaluate degrees of success.  Fifth is a group of 
processual models that cover the way each manager sets about decision-making and 
problem-solving; linear forms may be preferred to unstructured ones; heuristic-
supported decision-making preferred to data–based rational-empirical approaches.  
Last are the placebo models which include, for example, less useable ideas, platitudes 
about change, often fanciful slogans about management, idealistic aspiration, etc. that 
may be shared frequently with colleagues, but which are rarely, if ever, implemented. 
They have been absorbed from management discourse, informal conversations, 
humour and organizational stories often about traditions within the company.   
 
Cognitive depth or superficiality in the thinking of managers 
Regarding the cognitive depth and completeness of these mental representations that 
senior managers hold in readiness, little empirical evidence exists.  As in everyday 
decision-making, models may vary in depth of understanding, richness and 
consistency of informational support, degree of linkage with other ideas and level of 
anchorage in actual events and organizational contexts.  Educational psychologists 
have suggested that, as a result of the large range of learning processes available to 
professional people, deep structures may be distinguished from those that can be 
termed merely superficial frameworks (Entwistle and Tait 1990, Biggs 1993, Gordon 
and Delus 2002, Waugh 2002).  Deep structures are models or representations that are 
characterised by a fuller and often personal understanding of the concepts and 
processes involved.  They are, it seems, in a management context, likely to be 
connected through logical association with other sets of ideas emerging from sources 
such as educational or consultant led learning.  As the result of personal control in the 
learning process involved, deep mental representations may also be characterised by a 
critical and dialogic stance.   
 
That is to say the leader concerned is able from time to time to stand back and think 
out for himself or herself the relevance and validity of the model concerned.  By 
contrast, superficial frameworks are built up as a result of a lighter and externally 
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driven learning process.  These structures may owe much to adopted schemas or 
recipes, memorised from short training courses or inferred from project plans and 
linear timetables.  The element of thinking through for one-self is less strong, 
although a superficial framework may be constructed in a sufficiently generalised way 
so as to link well with other models in use.  The extent to which collective and 
organizational models that have been quickly adopted by new managers can be 
categorised as largely superficial structures, is unknown.  Essentially they have been 
developed through a learning process that occurred as a manager struggled to cope 
with organizational problems.  Little time had been available for internal or external 
dialogue.  A third and important category of model building through learning has at 
its heart the determination to excel (Waugh 2002).  Managers who operate these 
individually motivated models will have used some form of systematic search to 
acquire the best available recipes; time may have been allocated to reflection and care 
taken in the best use of feedback from recipes in use: when these managers change 
their personal goals they also reflect about the quality of models they have in use.  
Each of these categories of mental modelling may in turn be examined in terms of 
their completeness and their dialogic quality. 
 
Hypotheses about the Flexibility of Cognitive Structures 
 
(1) The stability of narrational and processual models 
Conventional wisdom has it that those who work in unstable environments or across a 
variety of business units need cognitive structures that are dynamic and subject to 
review:  that they must reflect about progress, review their own capacities, adapt 
existing models, build new ones, review decisions taken and obtain feedback from 
presentations they have given.  However, drawing from identity theorists and writers 
on consciousness it is suggested here that it is in narrational and ego-defensive 
models, especially those elements related to self protection, self control and social 
identity, that among mature managers, the smallest change is likely to occur. 
Similarly it is proposed that cherished processual models, associated with preferred 
modes of decision-making and dependent upon particular management competences, 
will show less change.  Accordingly it may be expected that managers whose models 
in use are predominantly narrational and processual will be perceived as consistent 
and sometimes more conservative players within their organization. They may retain 
these stable structures over time, through different jobs and across different 
organizations. 
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(2) The greater flexibility of diagnostic models 
By contrast it could be expected that diagnostic and sense making frameworks will be 
more susceptible to change as managers experience episodes of success and failure in 
the introduction of organizational change.  Accordingly, those managers in whose 
work diagnostic thinking and problem analysis form an important part will be likely 
to be seen by colleagues as developing and changing players within the 
management team.  Nevertheless it is important to note that executives in any 
organization may easily delude themselves into believing that a change has occurred 
in their thinking when, in reality, they have re-invented or recycled existing ideas 
(Ogbunna and Harris 1998).  Placebo material may be expected to change quickly as 
mangers enter new social contexts.   
 
(3) The problem of over-elaborated and complex mental models   
At first sight it may seem that those executives, who through careful review have 
adopted deeper cognitive structures and those with what has been termed individually 
motivated models, will show the greater flexibility in their thinking as problems and 
contexts change.  After all these are the managers we might expect to have developed 
a thoughtful and critical stance regarding their personal strategies and approach to 
problem-solving.  However, the picture regarding deeper cognitive structures that are 
well anchored in information and experience is far from clear.  While such structures 
may be characterised by a high level of awareness, over-elaborated and dominant 
models or recipes for action are likely to become problematic and difficult to adapt 
or replace with competing ideas. Similarly, long cherished superficial models 
characterised with little self-awareness or dialogic content, but supported by 
defensive habits such as avoidance of comprehensive feedback from colleagues and 
followers will tend to be enduring and hard to change. 
 
While mental model theory suggests that distinctive types of models may be 
associated respectively with rigidity or flexibility, it is important not to lose sight of 
the importance of the cognitive competences that business people must employ as 
they review, marshal and deploy their ideas.    Dialogic skills (Billig 1991,1996), both 
internally and in conversations with colleagues and competence in reflection and 
reflectivity (Shotter 1993, Cunliffe 2002) are likely to be significant in the 
management of feedback.  Cognitive empathy will enable some recipients of 
feedback to sense the undiscussed attitudes, emotional reactions and tacit models of 
their followers.  In combination with cognitive flexibility, these competences should, 
in theory, enable executives to detach themselves from long-cherished yet 
dysfunctional ideas and to construct more refined frameworks for action. 
 
Mental model theory for coaches and mentors 
In helping men and women who hold senior positions in their organizations to re-
examine their goals and action plans for the future it is sometimes necessary to 
discover the simple representations, frameworks and heuristics they already have in 
place.  Busy executives often depend upon these simple cognitive structures to make 
sense of their world, diagnose their problems, choose a course of action and tell their 
colleagues and followers about why they did what they did.  While managers in 
general can talk easily to colleagues, professional helpers and researchers about their 
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narrational and espoused models, other equally important sets of ideas are not so 
readily available.   
 
Mental model theory has it that such theories, often learned implicitly through 
experience, have never been articulated or even recognised by their owners as models 
that they employ.  To observers, such tacit theories in use may only be apparent 
through inference from the actions these managers carry out.  Consequently, strong 
skills are often needed by professional helpers and researchers to assist these 
executives to reflect about the actions they have taken, to recognise the theories in use 
they never knew they employed and, where appropriate, to recognise the cognitive 
inertia that leads to today’s problems being tackled by yesterday’s thinking 
(Hodgkinson and Sparrow 2002).  This paper has emphasised the view that instead of 
regarding senior managers as people operating with a repertoire of complete, 
consistent and well-integrated ideas linked to their personalities about how they 
should lead their enterprise, we should see their cognitive structures are often 
fragmented with frequently conflicting ideas about how to pull their staff along with 
them, how best to sell ideas and to manage the interventions they have planned. 
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